

# Dynamical models of mutually antagonistic groups

Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon

18 March 2016


V.A. Traag



Universiteit  
Leiden


# Fighting among friends

Two friends are fighting. (unstable)




# Fighting among friends

All friends, everybody happy. (stable)




# Fighting among friends

Two friends are fighting. (unstable)




# Fighting among friends

My enemy's enemy is my friend. (stable)




# Fighting among friends

Mutual enemies. (unstable)




# Fighting among friends


My enemy's enemy is my friend. (stable)




Balanced



Two Factions




Unbalanced






# Discrete social balance dynamics

One unbalanced triad, one balanced triad.




# Discrete social balance dynamics

Flip sign of a link.




# Discrete social balance dynamics

Only “improving” moves can get stuck (no flip improves).



# Discrete social balance dynamics


Discrete dynamics can take a long time to converge.




## Continuous (time) approach

- No more discrete positive or negative links.
- Indicate  $x_{ij}$  the opinion  $i$  has of  $j$ .
- Social balance:  $x_{ij}x_{jk}x_{ki} > 0$  for all  $i, j, k$ .
- Dynamics  $\dot{x}_{ij}$  such that  $\lim_t X(t)$  socially balanced?

$$\dot{x}_{ij} = \sum_k x_{ik} x_{kj}$$



$$\dot{X} = X^2$$



- Symmetric initial condition easy
- Decompose  $X = U\Lambda U^T$
- Then

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{X} &= X^2 \\ U^T \dot{X} U &= U^T X U U^T X U \\ \dot{\Lambda} &= \Lambda^2\end{aligned}$$

- Solution simple  $\lambda_i(t) = \frac{\lambda_i(0)}{1 - \lambda_i(0)t}$ .
- Blows up at time  $t = \frac{1}{\lambda_i(0)}$  for  $\lambda_i(0) > 0$ .
- If  $\lambda_1 > \lambda_2$  and  $\lambda_1 > 0$  then normalised converges to

$$\frac{X(t)}{|X(t)|} \sim u_1 u_1^T \sim \begin{pmatrix} + & - \\ - & + \end{pmatrix}.$$

- Converges to social balance.




- Non-symmetric (general) initial conditions more difficult.
- For  $\dot{X} = X^2$ , use Jordan Normal Form. Solutions blow up to


$$\frac{X(t)}{|X(t)|} \sim u_1 v_1^T \sim \left( \begin{array}{cc|cc} + & - & + & - \\ + & - & + & - \\ \hline - & + & - & + \\ - & + & - & + \end{array} \right).$$

- Does **not** converge to social balance.


$$\dot{x}_{ij} = \sum_k x_{ik} x_{kj}$$



$$\dot{x}_{ij} = \sum_k x_{ik} x_{jk}$$



$$\dot{X} = XX^T$$



- Symmetric case, identical behaviour.
- To solve general case, decompose

$$S = \frac{X + X^T}{2}, A = \frac{X - X^T}{2}.$$

leading to

$$\dot{S} = (S + A)(S - A), \dot{A} = 0.$$

- Change of variables  $Z = V^T e^{tA_0} S e^{-tA_0} V$ , and with  $D^2$  the diagonal of  $-A^2$ , leads to


$$\dot{Z} = Z^2 + D^2,$$

- Solutions blow up to

$$\frac{X(t)}{|X(t)|} \sim ww^T \sim \begin{pmatrix} + & - \\ - & + \end{pmatrix}$$

for some  $w$ .

- Almost every initial condition converges to social balance.




Traag, Van Dooren & De Leenheer. *PLoS ONE* 8, e60063 (2013).

# Motivation, evolutionary game theory

Agents either  
Cooperate or  
Defect


		C D	
C D	C	$b - c$	$-c$
	D	$b$	$0$

$i$  and  $k$  play:  $i$  and  $k$  cooperate.







$j$  and  $k$  play:  $k$  cooperates,  $j$  defects.




Should  $i$  cooperate or defect with  $j$ ?



# Reputation update



# Cooperation



Traag, Van Dooren & De Leenheer. *PLoS ONE* 8, e60063 (2013).

## Conclusions

- Discrete dynamics may not lead to social balance.
- $\dot{X} = X^2$  lead to social balance only in symmetric case.
- $\dot{X} = XX^T$  (almost) always leads to social balance.
- $\dot{X} = XX^T$  leads to cooperation, but also to conflict.

## Open questions

- Generalized social balance ( $> 2$  groups).
- Dynamics on sparse networks.
- Empirical corroboration of model.

Thank you!

Questions?

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